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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STEVEN RAY JAMES,
Petitioner/Appellant,

:

Case no. 960767-CA

vs.

:

Priority No. 3

HENRY GALETKA, Warden,
Respondent, Appellee.

:

ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY APPLIED THE "INTERESTS OF JUSTICE"
EXCEPTION TO THE APPLICABLE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
In its brief Appellee first contends that the trial court erroneously applied the "interests of
justice" exception to the applicable statute of limitation contained in Utah Code Ann. section 7835a-107(l) (1996). As Appellee aptly noted "neither section 78-35a-107 nor any prior appellate
opinion specifically defines what circumstances trigger the 'interests of justice' exception to filing
a timely petition."

(Appellee's brief at p. 9). With little, if any, statutory or precedential

guidance, and with a general and broad term such as "interests of justice" to interpret and apply
to the particular facts of a case, a trial judge is basically asked to make a fairness decision. In
deciding what is fair the judge has to weigh the competing interests of the parties and factor in the
possible prejudice or lack thereof to the respective parties. That is what the trial judge did in this

1

case, and that is what this Court must do in determining whether to uphold the trial judge' decision
on this issue.
In the case of Currier v. Holden. 862 P.2d 1357 (Utah App. 1993), this Court discussed
the competing policy interests where it was argued by the State that a petitioner's writ of Habeas
Corpus should be dismissed due to a filing beyond the applicable statute of limitations.

l

In

setting forth the interests of the State this Court noted that " . . . the core purpose of any statute
of limitation is to compel exercise of a right within a reasonable time to avoid stale claims, loss
of evidence, and faded memories." IcL At 1369. The question that should be asked now is "were
any of these purposes seriously jeopardized by the Appellant herein filing his petition 15 days
late?" The answer is a definite NO. especially when you consider two points. First, the issues
that Appellant included in his Petition were legal issues that did not necessarily involve delving
into the facts of the underlying charge. Consequently, there is no concern about "faded
memories" or "loss of evidence." And second, the remaining purpose of prohibiting stale claims
pales in comparison to the enormous policy interests supporting writs of habeas corpus. In setting
forth those interests this Court stated:
. . . the writ of habeas corpus is so important in Utah that Article I, section 5 of the
Utah Constitution expressly prohibits its restriction unless public safety requires it.
The writ is an extraordinary remedy invocable 'where the requirements of law have
been so disregarded that the party is substantially and effectively denied due process
1

Currier is the case where this Court held the prior statute
of
limitation
to contained
in section
78-12-31.1
to be
unconstitutional.
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of law. . . .'
(Citations omitted). IcL Essentially, the policy purposes behind a writ is protecting individual
liberty and substantial justice, and that is exactly what Appellant will be deprived of if his Petition
is not granted. In determining whether Appellant should be allowed to even argue his claims that
could involve substantial and serious denials of constitutional rights, the trial judge in this case
simply concluded that a deminimus delay of 15 days was not unreasonable, especially when you
consider that Appellant could be held unjustifiably up to 15 years in the state prison if his claims
were meritorious.
Appellee further argues that "the trial court's determination that petitioner's fifteen-day
tardiness was 'not unreasonable,' and, consequently excusable, similarly negates the statute's
effect. The legislature has already determined that any delay beyond one year is unreasonable."
(Appellee's brief at p. 10). This is not true. If this truly is the legislature's reasoning, then why
did the same legislative body include in the same statute the "interests of justice" exception to the
one-year rule? Obviously, the legislative intent is that sometimes late filings are reasonable,
otherwise the exception has no effect. It all comes back to the balancing of interests previously
discussed, and a 15 day delay is not unreasonable when you consider the potential injustices that
could be done, and that the purposes underlying the statute of limitation are not seriously violated.
On this issue Appellee finally argues that "buyer's remorse in the plea process does not
trigger the 'interests of justice' exception to excuse his untimely filing." (Appellee's brief at p.
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15). In response to this Appellant respectfully submits that "buyers remorse" is a legitimate
trigger if the buyer is sold a defective bill of goods, i.e, a guilty plea to a charge that he could not
have been convicted of due to the statute of limitations, when, as is the case here, the buyer was
not informed by his legal counsel of the statute of limitations bar in relation to this particular
charge.
THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR PROSECUTIONS OF FELONIES SHOULD
NOT BE WAIVABLE. AND IF IT IS WAIVABLE. APPELLANT DID NOT
KNOWINGLY WAIVE THIS RIGHT. AND THE AMENDED INFORMATION DID
NOT RELATE BACK TO THE ORIGINAL TIMELY FILED INFORMATION2
It is interesting to note that in response to the argument that the statute of limitations for
prosecution of felonies should not be waivable, Appellee propounds that a somewhat loose and
expansive reading of this statute should be adopted by this Court in that it should hold that a
criminal defendant may waive the statute's protections in the context of a plea agreement. (See
Appellee's brief at p. 18). The irony in this position is that earlier Appellee argues for a very
strict interpretation of the statute of limitations relating to filing of petitions for extraordinary
relief. Appellee can't have it both ways. If anything, it should be just the opposite. The reasons
is that the statute of limitations for prosection of felonies set forth in Utah Code Ann. section 76-1302 (1995),3 contains no language such as "in the interests of justice" that would give the judge
2

The arguments set forth herein respond to the arguments set
forth in Point II of Appellee's brief.
3

The text of the relevant portions of section 76-1-302 are as
follows:
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equitable powers to waive the deadline, whereas the statute of limitations for filing of a petition
for extraordinary relief set forth in Utah Code Ann. section 78-35a-107 (1996) does contain such
language. Clearly, the reason for the distinction is to protect the rights of the accused and to
ensure that no substantial injustices are done. In our judicial system it is commonly stated that it
is better for 100 criminals to go free than for one truly innocent person to be convicted. The
distinction in the two statutes just noted is consistent with that philosophy. In the case of the
statute for prosecution of felonies it is to protect against old claims that may be difficult to defend,
and in the case of the statute for filing of extraordinary writs it is to ensure that a person is not
incarcerated not one minute longer than is legally justifiable in spite of some technical procedural
error by the petitioner.
If this Court does hold that the statute of limitations is waivable, then Appellant re-asserts
his argument contained in his original brief that any such waiver was not done knowingly, and as
such, it should not be recognized as valid. You can't knowingly give up something that you don't
know you have, especially when you are relying upon the advice of counsel to tell you when you
have a right.

Except as otherwise provided, a prosecution for:
(a) a felony or negligent homicide shall be commenced
Within four years after it is committed;
(b) a misdemeanor other than negligent homicide shall
be commenced within two years after it is committed; and
(c) any infraction shall be commenced within one year
after it is committed.
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Appellant alternatively argues on page 23 of its brief that the statute of limitations does not
present a bar anyway because the amendment of the Information related back to the filing of the
original Information. In support of this argument Appellant cites Rule 15(c) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure which provides:
Whenever the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleadings arose out of the
conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the
original pleading, the amendment relates back to the date of the original pleading.
Appellee then notes that "at the time he murdered his son, petitioner wrapped the infant's body
in a tarp weighted down with rocks and threw the body into the Bear River to conceal it."
Appellee then argues that "concealing his baby's body by discarding it in the river formed an
integral part of the originally charged homicide. Therefore, the evidence tampering arose out of
the same transaction or occurrence which gave rise to the aggravated murder charges." (See
Appellee's brief at p. 24). This is not true. The reason why this is not true is that the homicide
was completed before Appellant wrapped the body in the tarp. Consequently, it was not part of
the same event or occurrence charged in the original Information. The occurrence charged in the
original Information was the murder of the infant. The wrapping and disposing of the body
occurred sometime after that. Therefore, the amendment does not relate back to the filing of the
original Information, and thus, the tampering with evidence charge is still barred by the statute
of limitations.
In response to Points III and IV of Appellee's brief, Appellant will stand on the arguments
6

previously set forth in his original brief.
CONCLUSION
Appellant's guilty plea to the tampering with evidence charge should be vacated.
Alternatively, due to the ineffectiveness of prior counsel, the entire plea bargain, and thus, the
entire sentence should be vacated, and the Appellant should have the opportunity of either
negotiating a new plea bargain or going to trial.
Respectfully submitted this [Z day of April, 1998.

SI^'Ts^U^
Mark T. Ethington
/
Attorney for Appellant '
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